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I. INTRODUCTION
In nineteenth century criminal procedure in the United States, extradition
treaties impacted the treatment of a person surrendered by a foreign state. In a
series of cases in state supreme courts, and one in the United States Supreme
Court, persons surrendered invoked extradition treaties to annul criminal
indictments. The cases involved persons who were surrendered pursuant to a
request based on a particular criminal charge, but then were charged with
additional offenses after being surrendered.
That additional charging violated a concept of extradition law called the
Rule of Specialty. A state that gains surrender on an extradition request is
deemed to violate the rights of the surrendering state if it prefers charges
additional to that on which the extradition request was based. For the United
States courts, the issue was whether this was an obligation that ran only between
the two states, or whether it could be invoked by the individual.
In an Ohio case, a county prosecutor added an additional charge to a man's
previous charge, although he was already surrendered and extradited for that
charge by England.' The Ohio Supreme Court annulled the additional charge
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as a violation of the Rule of Specialty.' Citing the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, the court said the individual could invoke the treaty:
This treaty is ... the law of the land, and the judges of every state are
as bound thereby as they are by the constitution and laws of the
Federal or State governments. It is ... the imperative duty of the
judicial tribunals of Ohio to take cognizance of the rights of persons
arising under a treaty to the same extent as if they arose under a
statute of the state itself.3
The court reached this conclusion even though the extradition treaty was silent
on the question of whether the individual could benefit from the Rule of
Specialty.
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court relied on the Ohio
decision when a similar issue came before it. The Court found that allowing an
additional charge following extradition would violate the treaty.4 Like the Ohio
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court inferred the right of an
individual to invoke the treaty and fashioned a remedy.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), a multilateral
treaty regulating the activity of consuls of a sending state in a receiving state,
similarly affects the treatment of persons charged with a criminal offense. One
of a consul's functions is to assist nationals charged with crimes. The VCCR
creates a triggering mechanism for such assistance by giving a detained foreign
national a right of access to a home state consul and by requiring the detaining
authorities to advise the foreign national of the right of access.5
Additionally, the VCCR requires a receiving state to provide a remedy if
the obligation is violated:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.6
Thus, unlike the extradition treaty at issue in Vanderpool and Rauscher, the
VCCR prescribes rights for the individual and requires a remedy if those rights
are violated. Despite this greater specificity on these two key issues, courts of
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
5. Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1969, art. 36, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
6. Id.
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the United States have been hesitant to accord rights to a detained foreign
national who is not provided information about consular access and even more
reluctant to give a remedy for violation of that right. That reluctance has
resulted in three cases filed against the United States in the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) by sending states whose nationals were not informed of the right
of consular access, but who were, nonetheless, convicted of a crime. In all three
cases, the foreign nationals were sentenced to death.
In the second of the two cases, brought by Germany, the ICJ said that in
the event of a violation the receiving state must provide "review and
reconsideration" of the conviction and sentence.7 The court stated:
if the United States ... should fail in its obligation of consular
notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology would
not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have been
subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be
incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of
the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.!
In the third case, brought by Mexico, the ICJ elaborated on the requirement
to review and reconsider. The ICJ reiterated that "review and reconsideration"
must be undertaken to "take account" of the violation. 9 The court said:
The question of whether the violations of Article 36, paragraph 1, are
to be regarded as having, in the causal sequence of events, ultimately
led to convictions and severe penalties is an integral part of criminal
proceedings before the courts of the United States and is for them to
determine in the process of review and reconsideration. In so doing,
it is for the courts of the United States to examine the facts, and in
particular the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation
of the rights set forth in the Convention."
In the United States, most courts entertaining VCCR claims have not
reached this question because, as indicated, they have found either that no right
exists invocable by the foreign national or that no remedy is required. Those
United States courts that have found in favor of the foreign national on these
two points have then faced the question of whether, and to what extent,
7. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27).
8. Id. at 513-14.
9. Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1, 131 (Mar. 31).
10. Id. 122.
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prejudice must have flowed from the violation before relief is granted. A
spectrum of possibilities presents itself. At one end would be no requirement
of prejudice, i.e., if there has been a violation of the right of consular access,
reversal follows. At the other end, one could construct a substantial barrier to
relief by requiring the foreign national to sustain a burden of persuasion that the
case would have ended in an acquittal had the information about consular access
been given at the time of arrest. Between these two possibilities lie potential
rules that would impose only a burden of production on the foreign national.
This would not require a finding that there would have been a different
outcome, but rather only a finding that consular assistance might have been
provided, and that it might have had an impact.
A. Standards as Found by Agencies of the Inter-American System
The ICJ did not further explain how a court is to determine whether a
violation requires reversal. Additional learning on that question, however,
comes from the inter-American human rights system that operates under the
Organization of American States (OAS). The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights issued an advisory opinion in 1999 on the question of whether,
specifically in the context of capital cases, a failure to comply with consular
access rights violates Due Process.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, after finding that a judicial
remedy is required for a consular access violation, stated that "non-observance
of a detained foreign national's right to information, recognized in Article
36(a)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the
guarantees of the due process of law."11 The court's view was that the oppor-
tunity for consular assistance is critical and may impact criminal proceedings
in a variety of ways and, therefore, is an important safeguard.
The court said that "notification to a detained foreign national of the right
to communicate with a consular official of his country will materially improve
the possibilities of a defense," and "procedural measures, including those taken
by the police will be done with greater concern for legality and greater respect
for the dignity of the person."' 12 The court said that the right to be informed
about consular access is a means of defense for the accused that is reflected, on
occasion in a determinative way, in the respect shown for his other procedural
rights. "3
11. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the




B. Burden of Proof
Two cases were subsequently decided by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR), also a part of the OAS, and which is a body
subsidiary to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The IACHR took its
task as one of implementing, in regard to specific cases, the standard set by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Each case concerned a Mexican national convicted of murder and
sentenced to death: Ramon Martinez Villareal in Arizona, 4 and Cesar Fierro
in Texas. 5 In each case the commission found that the foreign national had not
been informed about consular access and that this failure required a reversal of
the conviction.1
6
The IACHR did not state that it needed to find that the failure to inform
had led to an identifiable negative result for the foreign national, or that consular
assistance would have benefited the foreign national in a particular way. Since
it did not find a need for such a finding the IACHR did not impose any proof
burden, either of production or of persuasion, on the petitioners to demonstrate
a prejudicial impact.17
To evaluate the effect of a violation of an ensuing conviction, the IACHR
used a presumption. In the Fierro case, it stated:
As the Commission has previously held, fundamental due process
protections, such as the right to prior notification in detail of the
charges against a defendant and the right to effective counsel, are of
such a nature that, in the absence of access to consular assistance, a
foreign national could be placed at a considerable disadvantage in the
context of a criminal proceeding taken against him or her by a state.
Each case must be evaluated on its individual circumstances. Once
a failure to inform a foreign national of his right to consular
notification and assistance has been proven, however, a formidable
presumption of unfairness will arise unless it is established that the
proceedings were fair notwithstanding the failure of notification. 8
The IACHR thus requires an affirmative showing of fairness in the face of
the consular access violation. By this standard, it would appear that if a consul
14. Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 821, OEA/ser. L./V./I1.117, doc. 5, rev. 1 (2002).
15. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, OEA/ser. L.N./IH.1 18, doc. 5, rev. 2 (2003).
16. Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 821, 21; Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, 42.
17. Under the commission's procedures, the foreign national detainee is not a party to the
proceedings. A petition may be filed by any person, to inform the commission of a violation of rights. That
petitioner, whoever it may be, argues the case.
18. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, 166.
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might have played a constructive role in the defense, the "formidable
presumption of fairness" would remain unrebutted.
Applying this presumption to the facts of the Fierro case, the IACHR said,
"it is also not apparent, from the state's observations or otherwise, that Mr.
Fierro's proceedings were fair notwithstanding the state's failure to comply with
the consular notification requirements."' 9
C. Standard for Rebutting the Presumption of Unfairness
The Fierro case does not provide guidance on the limits of what an
affirmative showing of fairness must reveal, because the harm to Fierro from
lack of consular access was quite obvious. Shortly after arrest, a murder
confession was taken that likely could not have been obtained had a consul been
involved.2" The El Paso, Texas, police who detained Fierro had pre-arranged
with police in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, for Fierro's mother and step-father to be
arrested in Ciudad Juarez.2 The El Paso police used Fierro's fear of what
would befall his mother and step-father to convince him to confess.2 A Texas
court found the confession inadmissible but upheld the murder conviction on
other evidence.23 The commission noted the Texas court's conclusion that the
El Paso officer who testified to not having coerced Fierro had perjured
himself.2 4
The IACHR thought that a consul's participation might have averted the
coerced confession:
Mr. Fierro's confession was taken at a time when consular
notification and assistance may have been highly significant in the
circumstances. The consulate could, for example, have verified the
status of Mr. Fierro's mother and step-father, who were being held in
Mexico by the Mexican police, and thereby mitigated any detrimental
impact that their detention may have had on Mr. Fierro's
interrogation and the veracity of the resulting confession."
The IACHR thus engaged in analysis of how a consul might have impacted
the proceedings, but only by way of determining whether the presumption of
unfairness might be overcome on the facts of the case. The commission did not
19. Id.
20. See Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
21. Id.
22. Id.




require that there would have been a different outcome had a consul
participated.
Similarly in Martinez Villareal, the commission considered that the
proceedings had failed to satisfy Due Process, but again the deficiency was so
significant as to provide little indication of the outer limit. Martinez Villareal
apparently had little idea of what was occurring during this trial. In the
commission's finding:
the absence of notification under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations could on the information available
have had a significant effect on the fairness of Mr. Martinez
Villareal's criminal proceedings. According to the record, Mr.
Martinez Villareal was a Mexican national who was arrested and tried
in the United States, but who did not speak English and was
represented by an attorney who did not speak Spanish. The record
also indicates that Mr. Martinez Villareal was not familiar with the
U.S. legal system and that this, together with his linguistic limitations,
affected his understanding of and participation in the criminal
proceedings against him despite the presence of a translator. The
Petitioners claim, for example, that Mr. [Martinez] Villareal did not
understand which people in the courtroom comprised the jury or what
the purpose of the jury was, and that the voir dire proceedings were
not translated into a language that he could understand. The record
also indicates Mr. Martinez Villareal's attorney failed to contact his
family in Mexico and, moreover, personally attested through an
affidavit as to his overall inexperience and ineffectiveness in handling
Mr. Martinez Villareal's case. Further, there is evidence suggesting
that Mr. Martinez Villareal suffered from some degree of mental
deficiency during at least certain stages of the criminal proceedings
against him.26
D. Standard Applied by United States Courts
United States courts have not definitively addressed the issue of how to
assess a violation of the obligation to inform a foreign national about consular
access. In the only Article 36 case to reach the United States Supreme Court,
the matter was heard only on a last-minute request for a stay of execution and
without full briefing. The court rejected the request for a stay on grounds that
the applicant had not raised the Article 36 issue in a timely manner.27
The court, nonetheless, speculated on the impact of an Article 36 violation.
It said by way of dictum, "it is extremely doubtful that the violation should
26. Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 821,1 82.
27. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some
showing that the violation had an effect on the trial."'28 The court did not specify
whether by "effect" it meant a decisive effect, namely that the accused would
have been acquitted, or whether it meant that a consul might have played some
role. Neither did it specify who would carry proof burdens on the issue.
In a case from Illinois involving a Polish national convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, a United States district court, purporting to follow the
United States Supreme Court's dictum, said, "[t]o gain relief on a Vienna
Convention violation, then, a Petitioner must show: that his Vienna Convention
rights were violated; and that the violation had a material effect on the outcome
of the trial or sentencing proceeding."29 Applying this standard to the facts
before it, the court found little reason to believe that a consul could have had an
effect on the trial, because "evidence of Madej's guilt was substantial."3
Continuing, the court said:
It is possible, though, that the Consulate's participation would have
had an effect on the sentencing hearing ... Particularly in this case,
where trial counsel failed completely to undertake any investigation
of the client's life, character, and background in preparation for the
sentencing phase, the participation of the Consulate could possibly
have made a difference.3'
That formulation suggested that a proof burden rested on the foreign national,
but only to raise a possibility that consular assistance might have had an effect
on the outcome.
In an earlier case, U.S. v. Rangel-Gonzales, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed more precisely the proof burden.32 This
case was decided in 1980, at a time when that circuit found a remedy to be
required for an Article 36 violation.33 The court of appeals said that while it is
incumbent on a foreign national to raise the issue, the government must
disprove that the failure of notification did not prejudice the foreign national.
Applying the test to the case at bar, the court of appeals said:
the appellant in this case carried his initial burden of going forward
with evidence that he did not know of his right to consult with
28. Id. at 377.
29. United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F.Supp.2d 968, 980 (N.Dist.llI. 2002).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980).
33. The circuit's position changed with the decision quoted above, see United States v. Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000).
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consular officials, that he would have availed himself of that right had
he known of it, and that there was a likelihood that the contact would
have resulted in assistance to him in resisting deportation.34
The court of appeals, moreover, did not require a decisive effect on the
outcome of the proceedings. Rather, prejudice would be present if the foreign
national's contact with a consul, had it occurred, "would have resulted in
assistance to him," and if it appears that the foreign national was unaware of the
right of consular access and would have requested it if informed about it." That
approach is consistent with that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
which as indicated, considered a denial of the possibility of consular assistance
through non-notification as affecting multiple aspects of the proceedings.
The standard employed by United States courts in more recent cases comes
from the United States court of appeals in Rangel-Gonzales." Those courts that
have addressed the distinction between burden of production and burden of
persuasion have, as in Rangel-Gonzales, made clear that the evidentiary burden
on the foreign national is one of production only.
37
These courts have not construed "prejudice" to mean that the case would
have ended in an acquittal instead of a conviction. The Department of State has
made clear that such an approach would be unworkable and inconsistent with
the VCCR. In oral argument in Paraguay's case against the United States, the
Department said that it would be:
problematic to have a rule that a failure of consular notification
required a return to the status quo ante only ifnotification would have
led to a different outcome. It would be unworkable for a court to
attempt to determine reliably what a consular officer would have done
and whether it would have made a difference.3 8
In a case decided in light of the ICJ rulings, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals indicated deference to the ICJs decisions and a standard of
review similar to that of the United States court of appeals in Rangel-Gonzales.
34. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 533.
35. Id.
36. United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1097 (S.D.Cal. 1998); United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1126 (C.D.IU. 1999).
37. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F.Supp.2d at 1097 (citing Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 530-31, for the
proposition that the defendant must "produce evidence"); State v. Cevallos Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (stating that defendant "must produce evidence...").
38. Request for the indication of provisional measures, verbatim record, public sitting of 7 April
1998, para. 2.18 (statement of Catherine Brown, Assistant Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs), Concerning
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
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Hearing the case of Osvaldo Torres, a Mexican national facing imminent
execution in Texas, the court stayed the execution and ordered a trial court to
hold a hearing to determine "whether Torres was prejudiced by the State's
violation of his Vienna Convention rights in failing to inform Torres, after he
was detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate., 39 The
court issued its order without an explanatory opinion, but in a concurring
opinion, Judge Chapel said that by virtue of the United States' ratification of the
Optional Protocol, his court was obligated to comport with the ICJ judgment in
the Avena case.40 Prejudice would be present, Chapel, J., wrote, if Torres was
unaware of his right to consular access, if he would have availed himself of it
had he been informed about it, and if a Mexican consul would have provided
consular assistance.41
II. ANALYSIS
A requirement is unrealistic if it would involve a court finding that a consul
might have acted in a way that would have averted the conviction. The United
States' position in oral argument in the Paraguay case is sound. When a
detainee has not received consular assistance for not having been informed of
the right, one can never know what a consul might have done that would have
affected the proceedings in the foreign national's favor.
The approach taken in the inter-American system, and that taken in the
cited United States cases, is more realistic. A violation of the obligation to
inform a foreign national of the right of consular access gives rise to a
"formidable presumption of unfairness," in the words of the IACHR, because
of the myriad ways in which a consul may affect proceedings.42 Where the
foreign national was not informed, and where a consul did not participate, one
is left only to speculate on what a consul might have done. One can, as the
IACHR did in its two cases, cite unfair aspects of a particular proceeding as an
indication of problems a consul might have averted. Any decision-maker
seeking to make its decision as solid as possible would do so. However, once
the presumption of unfairness arises, the presumption should remain unless it
can affirmatively be shown that a consul would not have participated in the
case. So long as it appears that a consul might have participated had the
obligation to inform been met, the presumption of unfairness stands.
39. Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hearing, Torres v.
Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at9.
42. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, 66.
The Rangel-Gonzales approach is more consistent with international
practice than is the Madej approach. An international law violation must be
remedied by putting the situation in which it would have been if no violation
occurred. If information was not given to a foreign national at the time of arrest
about consular access, there should not need to be a finding that a consul might
have impacted the case in a particular respect. As the United States argued in
the Paraguay case, that approach requires too much speculation. In a case in
which no information was given to the foreign national and in which no consul
participated, one cannot surmise what role a consul might have played, or how
a consul's participation might have altered the course of the proceedings.
Criminal trials can result in a variety of outcomes, not limited to simply
acquittal or guilt on the charges filed. Charges can be reduced before or during
trial, plea bargains can be reached, and prosecutors can agree to recommend a
particular sentence. One can never know how a consul might have taken action
that could have affected these determinations. The presumption of unfairness,
as the IACHR put the matter, is "formidable." '43
43. Id.
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